INTRODUCTION
The International Criminal Court's (ICC) deterrence effect in situations of armed conflict extends only to the reach of its jurisdiction. 1 State succession, which often involves massive human rights violations, 2 casts doubt on the jurisdiction of the Court and the protection it offers because of questions regarding the continuity of treaty obligations, including those under the Rome Statute, formerly binding upon the predecessor State. This Note argues that customary international law supports the continued application of the Rome Statute in instances of State succession because the treaty articulates the necessary human rights and humanitarian law principles to fall under the customary international law rule for the continuation of human rights and humanitarian law treaties.
Two basic types of international law exist: treaties and customary international law. 3 Treaties arise out of express negotiations between State parties, resulting in certain rights and obligations to which the parties agree. 4 Human rights and humanitarian treaties obligate State parties to protect individuals living under those treaties. 5 Customary international law, on the other hand, arises not from express negotiations between sovereign States, 6 but rather from the practice of nations followed out of a sense of legal obligation. 7 However, customary international law-as with the law of treaties-imposes human rights and humanitarian obligations [Vol. 25:3
State succession and argues for the Court to assume the continuity of the Rome Statute in such an event.
II. JURISDICTION AND JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES AT THE ICC
The Rome Statute requires the Court to "satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it." 20 The Rome Statute's jurisdictional prerequisites include: crimes within the Court's jurisdiction; temporal jurisdiction; territorial and personal jurisdiction; and admissibility. 21 Article 12 of the Rome Statute enumerates specific preconditions for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction; these include a State's acceptance of jurisdiction with respect to subject matter; the scope of the Court's jurisdiction based upon which States must accept the Court's jurisdiction before the Court can act; and how a State can accept the Court's jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. 22 Domestic and international courts generally permit decisions involving jurisdictional questions to be reviewed immediately on appeal, because without jurisdiction, a court possesses no authority to conduct a trial. 23 The Rome Statute permits the prosecution and defense to appeal as of right decisions concerning jurisdiction. 24 Interlocutory appeals provide the added benefit of offering authoritative rulings on unsettled issues of law and assist in maintaining a consistent application of the law across cases before the same court. 25 An interlocutory appeal presents the most likely vehicle by which the Rome Statute's jurisdiction will be reviewed in the event of State succession because of its immediacy and grant as of right. 26 This necessitates a review of the history and basis of the ICC's jurisdiction, the interlocutory appeals process, and the potential scenarios for a challenge to the Court's jurisdiction. 20 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 19. 21 See generally SCHABAS, supra note 12, at 62 (referencing Articles 5, 11, 12, 17, 18 & 19 of the Rome Statute and explaining each Article's impact on the ICC's jurisdiction to hear cases). 22 Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 12; see also 24 Id. at 1; see also Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 82(1)(a). 25 WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, supra note 23, at 3. 26 The Rome Statute allows both the Prosecutor and the Defendant to utilize an interlocutory appeal to determine the grounds of jurisdiction. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 82(1)(a). It is reasonable to assume that one party, or the other, will appeal the decision of the PreTrial Chamber on jurisdiction in the event of State succession to either prevent the case from going to trial, or to ensure that the case goes to trial.
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A.
Automatic Jurisdiction in the Rome Statute
States utilize five bases of jurisdiction in criminal law: territory, personal, passive personality, protective, and universal. 27 International law tends to favor territory-based jurisdiction. 28 International tribunals constituted over the last half of the twentieth century based their jurisdiction in territorial, personal, and temporal. 29 The ICC's jurisdiction rests on the consent of those who agreed to be bound by the Rome Statute.
30 State parties agree to allow the Court to prosecute crimes committed on their territory or by their nationals. 31 This differs from previous international criminal tribunals, which possessed jurisdiction from U.N. Security Council Resolutions or as a result of victory in war.
32
The Rome Statute's adheres to the principle of State sovereignty, which contrasts with the initial draft presented by the International Law Commission (ILC) and others at the Rome Conference. 33 The ILC draft favored an "opt-in" system designed to ensure the Court hears cases brought before it. By "opting-in," according to the ILC's rationale, the State signaled ipso facto acceptance of jurisdiction over particular cases. 34 France proposed a "state consent regime," which required State approval in every proceeding against every individual suspect for the Court to possess jurisdiction. 35 Germany supported the system of "automatic jurisdiction," which vested the Court's jurisdiction upon ratification by a State.
36
The ILC draft's conservative approach, modeled after the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) submission requirements, provided States considerable freedom to pick and choose which cases went before the 27 SCHABAS, supra note 12. 28 Id. at 62-63 (listing examples of territory-based jurisdiction and statements in support of territory as the main basis for jurisdiction). 29 Id. at 63 (reviewing the bases of jurisdiction for the Nuremberg Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda). 30 Id. 31 Id. at 63-64 (calling territoriality and nationality the fundamentals of the Court's jurisdiction). 32 See id. at 62-64 (explaining the bases of previous international criminal tribunals' jurisdiction and how the ICC differs from them). 33 34 Rep. of the Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 33, at 43. 35 Kaul, supra note 33. 36 Id. [Vol. 25:3
Court. 37 The ILC commentary on the draft indicated a fear that an "optingout" system would incentivize States to deny jurisdiction to the Court for cases brought before it. 38 Twenty-seven States supported the ILC's "opt-in" system. 39 France's proposal required consent from the State on whose territory the acts were committed, whose nationals were the victims of the acts, and whose nationals were the suspected perpetrators. 40 Jurisdiction under the French proposal rested entirely with States. 41 The ILC and French proposals crafted a weak Court prone to paralysis and chaos due in part to the jurisdictional restrictions placed upon it. Germany's proposal for automatic jurisdiction provided the foundation for a stronger Court. 43 Support for automatic jurisdiction increased in the course of the Preparatory Committee's deliberations. 44 Article 12(1) of the Rome Statue adopted the wording of the German proposal almost identically. 45 The consensus for automatic jurisdiction acted as a building block to determining the nuanced and procedural aspects of the exercise of jurisdiction. 46 Proposals to operationalize the jurisdiction varied from universal jurisdiction for specific crimes to strictly territorial for all crimes. 47 53 It combines two elements to determine the scope of the Court's jurisdiction: 54 (1) State acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction 55 and (2) State acceptance of jurisdiction of the territorial State on which the crime in question occurred, or State acceptance by the State of the accused national. 56 The territoriality and nationality requirements of Article 12(2)(a) anchor the ICC in line with international law and the domestic law of most States. 57 Article 12(3), acceptance of jurisdiction by a non-State party, forms part of the overall scheme of the Statute for the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction. 58 This subsection expands the jurisdiction of the Court by providing for non-State parties to grant jurisdiction to the Court on an ad hoc basis. 59 It represents the "opt-in" provision of the ILC Draft 60 and received long-standing support by the delegations negotiating the Rome Statute. 61 The Statute contains no details concerning the commencement of an Article 12(3) declaration beyond lodging the declaration with the Registrar. 62 The State making an Article 12(3) declaration does not have all the rights and obligations of a State party. 63 States opting into the Court's jurisdiction must act within the system of the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 64 The Statute also requires the State to cooperate with the subsequent investigations and proceedings. [Vol. 25:3 Referral of a situation by the U.N. Security Council to the Prosecutor is another way for the Court to gain jurisdiction. 66 This procedure appeared in the ILC draft. 67 Countries expressed concern for politically-motivated referrals by the Security Council. 68 The ILC, however, believed such referrals would enable the Security Council to utilize the Court instead of resorting to the creation of ad hoc tribunals. 69 To alleviate concerns over political motivation, the Nordic countries offered a compromise: referrals would focus on specific situations rather than named individuals. 70 The ILC draft reflected this compromise by allowing for Security Council referral of "matters," which eventually became "situations" in the final statute. 71 Security Council referral resembles a form of universal jurisdiction because of the wide scope such a referral can take. 72 
B. Jurisdictional Challenges at the ICC
The drafting history of the Rome Statute indicates a deliberate negotiation between the States to achieve agreement on the jurisdiction of the Court. 73 This represented a critical step towards protecting people and preventing impunity because State parties submitted to the Court's jurisdiction upon ratification. 74 Articles 19 and 82 grant appeals of jurisdiction as of right, reflecting the importance of jurisdiction to the Court. 75 Article 19(2) specifies the parties capable of appealing the jurisdiction of the Court. 76 These parties include an accused, a person for whom the 2015]
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Court issued a warrant of arrest or summons to appear, a State which is conducting or has completed an investigation or prosecution of the case, and a State from which Article 12 requires acceptance of jurisdiction.
77
Only parties mentioned in Article 19(2) may challenge jurisdiction. 78 The Statute limits each party to one jurisdictional challenge. 79 Challenges brought prior to the confirmation of charges shall be referred to the PreTrial Chamber, while challenges brought after confirmation shall be referred to the Trial Chamber. 80 A challenge by a State whose acceptance of jurisdiction is required, or a State claiming jurisdiction based on a concurrent investigation, suspends the Prosecutor's investigation until the issue is resolved. 81 Decisions can be appealed to the Appeals Chamber under Article 82.
82
In the event of State succession, the two potential challengers to jurisdiction presented by Article 19 include an accused before the Tribunal and a State which submitted to the Court's jurisdiction under Article 12(3). 83 The most likely challenger will be an accused before the Court, arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction in the event of State Succession because the new State is not a State party to the Rome Statute.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION
State succession refers to "the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory."
84 Historically, successor States benefited from the "clean slate" principle, which removed treaty obligations to which they did not expressly agree. 85 This changed in the 1990s with the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
86
Approximately twenty-three successor States came into existence at that time, creating an urgent need to determine the international obligations incumbent on these newly-formed sovereigns, especially in the commission 77 See id. 78 See id. at art. 19(4). 79 See id. The Statute indicates that in exceptional circumstances more than one challenge can be undertaken. "Exceptional circumstances" is left undefined. State succession in the course of a trial might rise to the level of an "exceptional circumstance" to allow a second challenge to the Court's jurisdiction. 80 See id. at art. 19(6). 81 See id. at art. 19(7). 82 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 19(6). 83 The Rome Statute requires judges interpreting and applying the law to examine the Statute first, and then to applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the law of armed conflict. When these sources fail to provide the necessary guidance, judges turn to the general principles of law derived from the national laws of the world's legal systems. 88 The Court can only resort to the principles and rules of international law and the general principles of law when The Court may also apply principles and rules derived from its previous decisions. 90 Additionally, the Court's application and interpretation of the law "must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights."
91
A lacuna exists in the written law contained in the Rome Statute; it lacks any specific provision concerning State succession. 92 The two-prong lacuna test led to employing the customary international law of State succession to human rights and humanitarian treaties to determine whether the Court possesses jurisdiction.
A. The Formation of Customary International Law
Customary international law constitutes one of the main sources of international law. 94 It exists independently, even where identical rules occur in a treaty. 95 The formulation of customary international law takes a twoelement approach. 96 It develops "from a general and consistent practice of States followed by them out of a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris." 97 The North Sea Continental Shelf case provides a classic case on the processes of formation and evidence of rules of customary international law. 98 The ICJ described customary international law as:
State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;-and should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved. 105 The practice must be "in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in question,"
106 but not "in [an] absolutely rigorous conformity" with the supposed rule. 107 The opinio juris turns the usage, or practice, into a custom, rendering it part of the rules of international law. 108 The State taking the action "must have behaved so that their conduct is evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it." 109 Identifying opinio juris in the actions of States presents many challenges because of its subjective qualities. 110 At times, the ICJ utilizes U.N. General Assembly resolutions to confirm the existence of opinio juris, focusing on the content of the resolution, the circumstances surrounding its adoption, 101 North Sea Continental Self Cases, supra note 99, ¶ 77. 102 See, e.g., Nottebohm Case . 107 Nicaragua, supra note 95, ¶ 186 ("In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule."). 108 SHAW, supra note 5, at 84. 109 Nicaragua, supra note 95, ¶ 207 (quoting North Sea Cases). 110 See SHAW, supra note 5, at 87-89 (explaining the conundrum opinio juris presents when determining the legality of a principle of international law).
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and the attitude of the States concerned. 111 The ICJ also relies on the work of the International Law Commission and codification of major conventions to determine the opinio juris of States. 112 The interplay between treaty and customary law is also relevant because of the general recognition that treaties "may be reflective of pre-existing rules of customary international law; generate new rules and serve as evidence of their existence; or, through their negotiation processes, have a crystalizing effect for emerging rules of customary international law."
113

B. Human Rights and Humanitarian Treaties in State Succession
History contains numerous instances of State succession. 114 The Soviet Union, the Former Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia represent the most recent and relevant instances of State succession because their actions constituted the actions of "States whose interests are specially affected."
115
Recent judicial decisions shed considerable light on the interpretation of State successions of the late 1990s, providing a subsidiary means to defining the law. 116 A number of qualified publicists provide subsidiary means to interpret State succession and the continuity of human rights and humanitarian treaties, 117 offering further support for the theory as customary international law. 130 The Council decided that the two states would be regarded as succeeding to the European Convention on Human Rights retroactively from their date of independence. 131 This action occurred at the behest of the Council of Europe and, most importantly, the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic.
i. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties
132
A review of ratification records indicates there is no notification to any depository by either the Czech Republic or the Slovak Republic, indicating that this occurred ipso jure, without action on the part of the two successor states.
133
The European Court of Human Rights considers admissible individual petitions against the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic for violations that occurred prior to their formal entry in 1993. 134 As Kamminga relates, the Court notes in these decisions that "[t]he period to be taken into consideration began on 18 March 1992, when the recognition by the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, to which Slovakia [the Czech Republic] is one of the successor states, of the right of individual petition took effect."
135 Neither Slovakia nor the Czech Republic object to this approach to State succession. 136 
Soviet Union
The Soviet Union dissolved into four categories of States. 137 The Russian Federation constitutes the first category, a continuing State, as it claims to be the extension of its sovereign predecessor. 138 The world community generally accepted this fact. 139 The main reason for this was that the former constituent States of the Soviet Union all agreed to the proposition. 140 The Russian Federation informed the United Nations that it would honor all previous treaty commitments, which included human rights treaties. [Vol. 25:3
Ukraine and Belarus constitute the second category of States. 142 They existed prior to the Soviet Union collapse.
143 They were also parties to the treaties per the rules of the U.S.S.R. Constitution. 144 The dissolution did not impact their treaty obligations. 145 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania comprise the third category of States.
146 They claimed the breakup of the Soviet Union restored the independence they lost with Russian occupation in 1940. 147 They regard themselves not as new states, but as States re-exercising the sovereignty of which they were deprived.
148 They acceded to a number of treaties, including human rights treaties.
149
The fourth and largest category of States includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 150 This category represents the least coherent example regarding treaty succession.
151 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan succeeded to the Geneva Convention and its Protocols. 152 These countries insisted that they acceded to the different human rights treaties. 153 The Human Rights Committee decided, reluctantly, that a successor state may opt to accede rather than succeed to the Covenant, 154 but for the purposes of the Covenant they are considered having been State parties since independence in 1991. 155 The Committee continues to utilize the language of succession in dealing with this group of countries.
156
The Former Yugoslavia 
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and Slovenia informed the United Nations that they considered themselves bound by the treaties to which the former Yugoslavia was a party. 158 This was also confirmed with regards to all human rights treaties.
159 Slovenia indicated that victims of human rights violations could seek remedies against Slovenia for actions committed by the former Yugoslavia.
160 Serbia argued that it represented the continuation of the former Yugoslavia and was not required to succeed to any treaties. 161 The Arbitration Commission of the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, or Badinter Commission, issued an opinion stating that Serbia constituted a new state. 162 The United States held the same position. 163 The other States of the former Yugoslavia also considered Serbia to be a new State. 164 
iii. Judicial Decisions of the International Court of Justice
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
The United Nations requested the International Court of Justice to offer an Advisory Opinion on three specific, interwoven questions concerning reservations to the Genocide Convention. 165 The Court framed the first question in the following terms:
Can the reserving State be regarded as being a party to the [Genocide] Convention while still maintaining its reservations if the reservation is objected to by one of more of the parties to the Convention but not by others? 166 The Court observed that a State cannot be bound to a treaty without its consent and, as a result of this rule of treaty law, no reservation can be effective against a State without its agreement. 167 This concept derives from notion of contract bargaining. 168 The The Court concluded that the principles underlying the Convention take on a universal character and bind States without any of the conventional obligations of treaties.
171
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
On March 20, 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina instituted proceedings against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for alleged violations of the Genocide Convention.
172 Yugoslavia objected to the Court's jurisdiction because the Convention did not bind Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time of its submission to the Court, raising the issue of automatic succession to treaties. 173 The majority avoided the State succession issue and determined the Court possessed jurisdiction because the United Nations recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina's representative as head of state before international bodies and international agreements. 174 The majority opinion stated in dicta that "Bosnia and Herzegovina could become party to the Convention through the mechanism of State succession." 175 The Court also reaffirmed the special characteristics of the Genocide Convention, and found the rights and obligations enshrined in the Convention to be rights and obligations erga omnes.
176
Judge Shahabudden in a separate opinion argued that the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention "required parties to observe it in such 169 Id. at 21-23. 170 Id. at 23. 171 Id. 172 Application of the Genocide Convention, supra note 85, at ¶ 1. 173 Id. at ¶ 16. 174 Id. at ¶ 44. 175 Id. at ¶ 20. 176 Id. at ¶ ¶ 22, 31.
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Level of Customary International Law
The actual practice of States and the opinio juris for establishing a rule of customary international law that human rights treaties and their obligations continue in the event of State succession exists. The State practice referenced above indicates that the actual practice of States is for continuity of human rights treaties. This State practice satisfies the "actual practice" element of customary international law because it involved the acts of interested States and "occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved." 211 The actions of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights also provide significant support for the State practice component because they represent a number of third States directly affected by the succession of States, and as implementers and interpreters of the ICCPR and the ECtHR human rights treaty regimes.
The European Court of Human Rights incorporated the U.N. Human Rights Committee's General Comment, and its continued admission of cases from the period in which the former Czech countries were not State parties, per se, provides considerable support for the State practice element. The succeeding States indicated they considered themselves bound by the treaties due to succession. 212 This establishes the strongest basis for the opinio juris element because it derives from the States involved. The opinions of third States also supports the opinio juris element. The perspective from Western countries that the succeeding States were bound by succession adds to the opinio juris because these States were peripherally involved because they represented the neighbors of these States, and members of the community of nations concerned with the protection of human rights in the law of nations.
Finally, the actions and comments of judicial bodies provide support for the continuation of human rights treaties in the event of State succession. The Reservations to the Genocide Convention adds significant weight to the legal obligation of continuity for human rights treaties. While the majority in the Application of the Genocide Convention avoided the direct issue of continuity, the two separate Opinions focused directly on that issue. These two opinions provide weight to the fact that there is a strong sense of legal obligation for the continuity of human rights treaties. These rulings predate the incorporation by the European Court of Human Rights of the General Comment, which illustrates the evolution of international law in this area. The required "actual practice" of states and the opinio juris for those actions support the conclusion that a rule of customary international law exists that in the event of State succession human rights International human rights, humanitarian, and criminal law share a common genesis. 213 Broadly, they stand for the protection of the interests of individuals. 214 A precise definition of human rights treaties beyond this general understanding presents a key challenge: too broad a definition encompasses too many treaties to carve an exception in State succession for human rights treaties. 215 This section first reviews the origins and legal theories behind human rights, humanitarian, and criminal law. It then dives into the specific characteristics of human rights treaties to offer a template for human rights treaties. It concludes by applying this theory to the Rome Statute to argue that it is a human rights treaty, requiring continuity in State succession.
A. The Origins of International Human Rights, Humanitarian, and Criminal Law
The norms behind international human rights, humanitarian, and international criminal law trace their origins to the writings of Sun Tzu, who advocated for the humane treatment of the sick, the wounded, prisoners, and civilians. 216 These ideas independently developed in other civilizations across the globe, influencing the creation of human rights and humanitarian law. 217 245 faces the issue of State succession in the provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 246 In 2008, an armed conflict erupted in each of those areas, pitting Georgian troops, Russian troops, Abkhazians, and South Ossetians against each other.
247 International observers reported a numerous instances of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 248 The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC opened an examination into these alleged crimes shortly after the violence ended. 249 The investigation continues with some difficulty due to the succession situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 250 Abkhazia and South Ossetia consider themselves to be independent nations. 251 When Georgia ratified the Rome Statute, Abkhazia and South Ossetia existed as semi-autonomous regions of Georgia but still within its territorial control and government. 252 Individuals in those regions who participated in the armed conflict in 2008 and committed war crimes or crimes against humanity face trial before the ICC, if warrants are issued. The Court's jurisdiction would be based on territory and personality because the territory of Georgia includes Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Defense council in such a case would challenge the jurisdiction of the court based on both principles, arguing that Abkhazia and South Ossetia constitute independent successor States. They would argue that the court
